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I
INTRODUCTION
As we approach the third decade of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA")' era, to what extent is it fair to say that ERISA is a
statute that sounds in equity? What difference does the answer make in terms
of the statute's success in reforming the delivery of employee benefits?
If we confine our consideration of the first question to the language and
history of the statute, the answer is straightforward: Congress borrowed heavily
from equity. ERISA section 4032 requires that assets of employee benefit plans
be held in trust. Sections 404, 405, and 406' impose equity-based fiduciary
duties on persons exercising control of plan assets or discretionary control of
plan management, and section 4094 creates liability for breach of such duties.
Section 5025 authorizes participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Depart-
ment of Labor to bring civil suits to obtain equitable relief appropriate to
enforce the provisions of the legislation and of employee benefit plans.
Measuring the actual impact of ERISA's debt to equity on the delivery of
employee benefit plans is considerably more problematic. ERISA's version of
equity includes a rule of prudence and a rule requiring plan fiduciaries to
discharge their obligations for the sole purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries (the "exclusive purpose rule"). Such rules
have failed to provide a satisfactory, or at least complete, framework for
resolving basic and recurring statutory issues.' For example, may a pension plan
accept a reduced rate of return in favor of investments that create employment
opportunities for participants? May a court award punitive damages to a
participant wrongfully denied benefits? What standard should courts use in
reviewing a denial of benefits? Such questions raise straightforward policy issues
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1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
2. Id. § 1103(a).
3. Id. §§ 1104-1106.
4. Id. § 1109.
5. Id. § 1132.
6. Id. § 1104.
7. Daniel Fischel and John Langbein have earlier argued that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule
"misdescribes the reality of the modem pension and employee benefit trust." Daniel Fischel & John H.
Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105,
1107 (1988). Their seminal article suggests that Congress seized upon the wrong standards for judging
fiduciary behavior, that it should have explicitly recognized the employer interest in employee benefit
plans, and that it should have adopted the trust duty of impartiality to mediate between disputes among
employees.
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concerning the delivery of employee benefits. Yet ERISA pushes courts into
responding to such questions by applying rules developed under equity, shunting
into the background issues of benefits policy.
In its attempt to control dishonest behavior, ERISA adopted not only the
exclusive purpose rule mentioned above, but also a series of specific rules
prohibiting transactions between a plan and parties with preexisting relationships
with the plan. These rules reflect principles that equity birthed and nurtured to
prevent self-dealing on the part of trustees. In theory, ERISA's exclusive
purpose and prohibited transaction rules, because of their great breadth, should
serve prophylactically, keeping plan fiduciaries out of even the peripheral zone
of self-interested conduct. Experience with the statute suggests, however, that
the shape of the standards used to restrain self-interested behavior may be less
important than effective monitoring of such behavior; some actors will ignore
even exacting standards if they believe there is little risk of apprehension.
On the whole, then, my conclusions about the effects of ERISA's version of
equity on the delivery of employee benefits are not particularly sanguine.'
Nevertheless, employee plans are entities in which some people hold and control
money for the benefit of others. As a result, principles derived from equity are
relevant to any discussion about employee plans. At the same time, these
principles cannot furnish thoroughly considered answers to questions concerning
benefits policy. Complete answers must take account of considerations such as
the governmental interest in ensuring the efficient use of the tax subsidies for
health and retirement plans, the inherently contractual nature of the benefit
promise,9 and protection of both the nation's elderly and workers.
Part II of this article describes, for background purposes, the structure of
ERISA's provisions related to fiduciary conduct, revealing a fairly high degree
of legislative piety to equity, particularly the law of trusts. Part III, using three
unresolved benefits issues as examples, argues that rules drawn from equity have
not satisfactorily resolved basic issues of benefits policy. Part IV suggests that
use of equitable principles are a necessary, but insufficient, measure to curb
dishonest fiduciary behavior.
8. This does not mean that ERISA is failed legislation; it means only that ERISA is not perfect.
ERISA is a complex statute that forever changed the legal landscape of employee benefit plans. For
example, ERISA's creation of federal vesting standards for pension plans, see I.R.C. § 411; ERISA § 203,
29 U.S.C. § 1053, has had a pronounced effect on the benefit contract. ERISA introduced dollar limits
on benefits for the affluent, thereby limiting the tax-sheltering possibilities of pension plans for the highly
compensated. See I.R.C. § 415. ERISA also introduced minimum funding standards. See I.R.C. § 412;
ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082. ERISA created a federal program insuring benefits in defined benefit
plans. Id. §§ 4001-4002, 29 U.S.C. 99 1301-1461. Although subject to criticism, see, e.g., Richard
Ippolito, Pension Security: Has ERISA Had Any Effect?, 2 Regulation 15-20 (No. 2, 1987), reprinted in
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFrr LAW (John Langbein & Bruce Wolk, eds., 1990), this program has
provided important protection for worker expectations that they will be paid their benefits. Moreover,
the introduction of meaningful federal regulation of pensions and other employee benefits in itself was
an important idea, one that might be built on in the future.
9. But see Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 575 (1992)
(arguing that contractual framework poorly fits benefit policy issues).
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The article concludes that Congress should revisit basic issues of benefits
policy for which judicial reliance on equity has not furnished fully considered
answers. The conclusion, though, suggests that such issues may be almost as
hard to tame legislatively as they have been judicially. The problem is that the
overarching policy decision to furnish retirement and health benefits through the
private employment market rests uneasily on competing notions: government
regulation is necessary to ensure that private law adequately delivers benefits,
but too much regulation diminishes the willingness of employers to sponsor plans
at all. If this tension is intractable, direct government provision of health and
retirement benefits may ultimately replace the current voluntary private system.
II
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ERISA AND EQUITY
ERISA is a multifaceted statute, but, arguably, at its core are the standards
of conduct it establishes for those entrusted with the administration of employee
benefit plans. The relationship between plan officials and plan participants is
heavily laden with fiduciary aspects: the former manage plan assets for the
purpose of providing benefits to the latter. It is hardly surprising, then, that
Congress settled on equity, and particularly trust law, as the appropriate
framework for regulating the conduct of plan fiduciaries.
A. Trust Law as a Framework for ERISA
1. The Legislative History of ERISA's Fiduciary Standards. As an initial matter,
one must consider why Congress decided to federalize rules of conduct for plan
administrators. Most plans-at least pension plans-were set up as trusts, even
before ERISA, and thus were subject to state trust law.10 The legislative history
of ERISA identified three problems with relying on state trust law to provide
standards for fiduciary conduct.11
First, the assets of some pre-ERISA plans were managed by insurance
companies: thus, no trust existed. Second, state trust law, committed as it is to
effectuating settlor intent, allowed settlors to modify and even eschew trust
principles as part of the trust indenture. Third, the trust law of the different
states failed to provide a uniform set of rules governing fiduciary behavior, which
was increasingly desirable given the interstate nature of many retirement plans.
ERISA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to adopt
"principles of fiduciary conduct ... from existing trust law, but with modifica-
tions appropriate for employee benefit plans."12  At the plan level, ERISA
10. See generally Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of Retired Workers, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 909,
922 (1970).
11. See, e.g., H.R REP. NO. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1973), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 2358-59 (1976)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA]; S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1976),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra, at 615.
12. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note ?1, at 13, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA
at 2360.
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section 403(a)1 3 requires that employee benefit plan assets be held in trust, with
certain limited exceptions. 4  Moreover, ERISA's substantive fiduciary
provisions apply to all plans, even those that the statute exempts from the trust
form.1
5
At the individual level, ERISA has broadly defined the persons and entities
subject to its substantive fiduciary requirements. The statute classifies such
persons as "fiduciaries," which it defines as persons or entities who exercise
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management or
disposition of plan assets; those who render investment advice for a fee; or those
who have discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administra-
tion of the plan. 6 The definition of fiduciary is broad, and the courts and the
Department of Labor have interpreted the term with moderate liberality. For
example, a corporate board member becomes a fiduciary if the board is charged
with appointing a plan trustee.17 ERISA's substantive fiduciary rules, however,
apply to plan fiduciaries only to the extent they perform fiduciary functions.18
2. ERISA's Substantive Fiduciary Standards. ERISA's legislative history
indicates that its fiduciary section "in essence, codifies and makes applicable to
... fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of
trusts."' 9  ERISA effects this codification with two related sets of fiduciary
standards: the first is a series of general trust principles;2' and the second is a
list of specifically proscribed activities. 21
The general trust principles provide that a plan fiduciary must discharge his
or her duties solely in the interests of the plan's participants, act prudently (the
"prudent man rule"), diversify plan investments, and act in accordance with plan
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
14. The most important of these exceptions is for plans whose assets consist of insurance contracts.
ERISA § 403(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1).
15. Id. § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) provides that ERISA's fiduciary standards apply to employee
benefit plans with only limited exceptions. The exceptions include governmental plans, church plans,
and certain plans providing benefits for highly compensated employees.
16. Id. § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. 1002(21).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 2509 (1990) (providing that board members are fiduciaries to the extent they
perform fiduciary duties, including appointment of other plan fiduciaries); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113,
133 (7th Cir. 1984) (directors "performed fiduciary functions in selecting and retaining plan administra-
tors"); United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 669 F.2d 124 (3d Cir.
1982). While the term "fiduciary" is broad, it is not all-encompassing. It does not, for example,
ordinarily reach individuals who provide accounting, legal, or arbitration services to a plan. See, e.g.,
Anoka Orthopaedic Assoc. v. Lechner, 910 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Roth, 729 F. Supp. 391
(D.N.J. 1990); DOL Adv. Op. 79-66(A) (Sept. 14, 1979). Moreover, an employer does not, by virtue of
designing and adopting a plan, become a fiduciary. See, e.g., Letter from Department of Labor to John
Erlenborn (Mar. 13, 1986), reprinted in 13 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 472 (1986) [hereinafter Erlenborn Letter];
United Independent Flight Officers v. United Air Lines, 756 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985).
18. See, e.g., Erlenbom Letter, supra note 17; Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1982)
(bank's fiduciary responsibility limited to investment advice). All fiduciaries, however, are liable for
breaches of co-fiduciaries if they had knowledge of the breach and failed to take steps to remedy it.
ERISA § 405(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3). See also Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin, 29
C.F.R. § 2509 75-5 (1975).
19. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 11, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF ERISA at 2358.
20. ERISA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
21. Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
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instruments.22 The statute's legislative history indicates an expectation "that
courts will interpret the prudent man rule and other fiduciary standards bearing
in mind the special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans intended to
be effectuated by the Act."23
The second set of standards is a more particularized set of prohibitions
against fiduciaries doing any of the following: causing the plan to enter into
transactions with parties already related to the plan ("party-in-interest prohibi-
tions"),24 using plan assets for the fiduciary's own account,' or acting on
behalf of a party or receiving compensation from such party with respect to a
transaction involving the plan.26 The "party-in-interest" transactional prohibi-
tions are broad and explicit, proscribing dealings with all "parties in interest," a
term encompassing most individuals and entities with preexisting relations with
the plan.27 ERISA includes statutory exemptions from the prohibited transac-
tion rules and establishes a procedure in which the Department of Labor can
create further exemptions administratively.'
The trust law concepts from which ERISA's fiduciary duties are derived and
their ERISA counterparts may be contrasted in the context of specific fiduciary
duties imposed upon plan administrators.
First, both ERISA and trust law impose a duty of loyalty on plan and trust
administrators. The common law of trusts imposes an unyielding duty on
trustees to administer the trust in the sole interest of the beneficiaries. This duty
proscribes self-dealing of any sort on the part of the trustee.29 The principle
obviously reaches situations in which the trustee has in fact overreached, but it
also applies to transactions that are substantively fair to the trust at the time of
the transaction, to guard against the possibility of self-dealing.
The broad reach of the duty has been explained as acknowledging the aspect
of human nature that makes it "generally, if not always, humanly impossible for
the same person to act fairly in two capacities and on behalf of two interests in
the same transaction .... If one of the interests involved is that of the trustee
personally, selfishness is apt to lead him to give himself an advantage." 3 It can
22. Id. § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
23. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 11, at 12, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA
at 2359.
24. ERISA § 406,29 U.S.C. § 1106. Transactional prohibitions include sales, leases, and exchanges
of property; furnishing of goods, services, and facilities; transfers of plan assets; entering into loans; and
plan acquisitions of employer stock or real property in excess of statutory maximums. Id. § 406(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1).
25. Id. § 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1).
26. Id. § 406(b)(2),(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2),(3).
27. Id. § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 102(14). Parties in interest include plan fiduciaries, employers,
employees, unions, plan service providers, officers, directors, and 10% shareholders.
28. See generally id. § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108. For an example of an administrative exemption, see
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 76-1, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740 (1976) (exempting office lease and
administrative service transactions in which multiple employer plans are involved).
29. See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543
(2d ed. 1960). Under trust doctrine, a transaction between a trustee and a trust is not void, only
voidable. WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, III SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 206 (4th ed. 1988).
30. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 543.
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also be justified as a means of excusing trust beneficiaries from the difficult task
of assessing or proving a transaction's fairness after the fact.
The duty of loyalty also proscribes a trustee from entering a transaction for
the purpose of benefitting a third party, rather than the trust beneficiary.31
Here, though, the problems of identifying improper transactions are more
difficult. In the case of self-dealing, the relevant question is not generally
difficult to answer: Did the trustee deal with the trust? In the case of a
transaction with a third party, however, the relevant question is: Did the trustee
intend to benefit the third party? This question can be particularly nettlesome
if the trustee can colorably argue that at the time of the transaction he or she
was motivated by potential benefit to the trust beneficiaries, and that benefit to
the third party was merely incidental.
ERISA reflects the trust law requirement of loyalty by requiring plan
fiduciaries to discharge their obligations solely in the interest of the plan's
participants" ("exclusive purpose rule") and through the prohibited transaction
rules.
The combination of ERISA's prohibited transaction rules and its exclusive
purpose standard are both more and less demanding than the general trust rule
of loyalty. The trust rule of loyalty renders voidable a transaction between a
trust and trustee.33 ERISA, in contrast, absolutely prohibits transactions not
only between a plan and fiduciary, but also between a plan and any party in
interest.' On the other hand, ERISA includes broad exceptions to its general
prohibitions.35
The rigorous loyalty rules embodied in ERISA are, to some extent, belied by
the statute's explicit tolerance of employer fiduciaries, whose interests in plan
decisionmaking may well vary from the participants who, under the statute,
purportedly command absolute fidelity from plan fiduciaries.36  Some have
argued that this tolerance modifies ERISA's exclusive purpose rule by tacitly
recognizing that fiduciaries will administer the plan for the benefit of both
employees and employer.37 However, the exclusive purpose rule literally denies
the legitimacy of these interests, and neither ERISA's legislative history nor
judicial construction of its provisions supports this view of the statute, at least not
explicitly.
The second fiduciary duty imposed upon plan administrators and trustees is
the duty of prudence. Trust law also imposes a duty of prudence on trustees.
In 1974, when ERISA was enacted, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts standard
of prudence directed the trustee "to make such investments and only such
investments as a prudent man would make of his own property having in view
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
32. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
33. See FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 312.
34. See supra note 27.
35. See supra note 28.
36. ERISA § 408(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c).
37. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 7, at 1158.
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the preservations of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to
be derived."'
Under this rule, courts generally tolerated investment decisions that were
later found to be unwise, so long as the decisions were supportable at the time
they were made.39 Some investments, however, could never be considered
prudent, especially those of a speculative nature. For example, trustees could not
purchase securities on margin, or invest in speculative securities or the securities
of new industries.' Moreover, several states historically maintained lists of
permitted investments-some of which excluded common stock-though the
overwhelming trend by 1974 was toward dramatically fewer restrictions.
41
However, trust law generally permitted the settlor of a trust to excuse the trustee
from particular trust requirements, including any proscription of investments in
common stock or other investments.
Trust law also traditionally tested prudence on a per-investment, rather than
portfolio, basis, which permitted beneficiaries to attack soured investments even
though the trust's overall return on investment might be strong.42 The
Restatement, however, stated that, in deciding on whether an investment is
reasonable, a trustee should consider the nature of other trust investments and
the particular needs of the trust, among other factors.43 The Restatement's
approach suggested that portfolio considerations could have been used to defend
particular investments in some circumstances.
ERISA modified these concepts dramatically, substituting for the generalized
"prudent man" of the Restatement a more flexible prudent person, one not tied
to "preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be
derived."" Under ERISA, a fiduciary's prudence is judged in relation to the
decisions of a "prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959). The classic judicial articulation of this
principle is found in Harvard v. Armory, 9 Mass. (1 Pick.) 446 (1830), a case in which Harvard College
argued that a trustee had acted imprudently by investing in the stock of manufacturing and insurance
companies. The Court wrote that the trustee
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men
of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
Id. at 461. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS introduction at 3-4 (1990) (providing a succinct history
of the rule).
39. E.g., Matter of Clark, 257 N.Y. 132 (1931).
40. FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 227.6.
41. Id. § 227.5. Historically, many states have prohibited investments in even publicly traded
common stock, and some states retain this restriction.
42. If gain and loss result from a single breach of trust, courts may permit the gain to offset the loss
for purposes of computing the loss for which the trustee must account. See FRATCHER, supra note 29,
§ 213. The question is whether the good investments and sour investments constitute an indivisible set
of trustee decisions.
43. FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 227.12.
44. Compare ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 227. The Restatement prudence rule had provided protections for both income and remainder
trust beneficiaries, concerns arguably not present in the typical employee benefit plan.
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matters."'45 This standard allows fiduciaries to consider their plan's particular
requirements, such as the need for liquidity, the size of the plan, the type of plan,
and the ages and characteristics of the employees.
Perhaps the most important departure of the ERISA prudence rule from the
traditional trust rule was the minimization of the importance of particular
investments. Under ERISA, prudence is judged by the anticipated performance
of the total portfolio given the requirements of the plan. 6 Department of
Labor regulations provide that fiduciaries act prudently by giving appropriate
consideration to all facts and circumstances that the fiduciary knew, or should
have known, were relevant to an investment and its role in the plan's total
portfolio.
47
ERISA prefigured a revised Restatement prudent investor rule. Adopted in
1992, the revised rule' provides:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds
of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms,
distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.
(1) This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and
is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust
portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should incorporate
risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.
4 9
Third, traditional trust law and ERISA generally imposed a duty on the
trustee and plan administrator to diversify investments. The Restatement
provides that trustees must diversify investments unless they can prove that,
under the circumstances, it would not have been prudent to do so.5"
Diversification reduces the risk of large portfolio loss by ensuring investments
sufficiently diverse to minimize risks common to similar investments. Although
the duty is often considered a responsibility separate and distinct from the
general prudence requirement, it may also be understood as an application of the
prudent man rule, since a prudent person would select every investment with at
least some eye to whether the investment added to or detracted from the
portfolio's diversity.
51
Relatively few published cases or statutes exist that provide specific standards
to gauge whether a trustee has satisfied a diversification requirement. However,
under trust laws the duty is violated where trust assets are too heavily invested
in a single company,52 a single industry, 3 a single class of security,' or a
45. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
46. The preamble to the Department of Labor's regulations on prudence indicates that precious
metals and stock in start-up corporations-investments once barred to trusts in a number of states-may
be appropriate investments for some plans. 44 Fed. Reg. 37224-25 (June 26, 1979).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1991).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227.
49. Id.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
228.
51. Indeed, the Restatement moved the diversification requirement from a separate section in the
second restatement to a subsection of the prudent investor rule. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 228 with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b).
52. Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184 (1890), cited in FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 228.
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single geographic region.55 Courts have indicated tolerance for single invest-
ments as large as twenty-two percent of a trust fund,56 but an English court
found that an investment of as little as ten percent of a trust's assets in a single
bank was too high." Undoubtedly, much depends on the circumstances. For
example, a small trust fund is less able to diversify than is a large one, and some
investments, such as Treasury notes and highly rated corporate bonds, are safer
than others.
ERISA's diversification rules do not explicitly modify traditional trust law,58
except to the extent that ERISA generally prohibits the trust settlor from
drafting the trust indenture to reduce prudence and diversification require-
ments.5 As is the case with traditional trust law, ERISA does not specify
numeric requirements for investment diversification. ERISA's legislative history
indicates that diversification should be judged in light of the plan's purpose, the
amount of assets involved in particular investments, the financial and industrial
conditions at the time of investment, the degree of geographic and industrial
diversity reflected in the portfolio, the mix of equity and debt in the portfolio,
and the maturity dates of debt instruments.'°
Fourth, traditional trust law requires a trustee to follow the trust inden-
ture.61 ERISA similarly provides that a fiduciary must act in accordance with
plan documents, except to the extent the documents are inconsistent with
statutory requirements.62
The duty to follow a trust indenture often requires trustees to exercise
discretion, which may range from determining how to invest trust assets to
deciding on the timing of trust distributions to beneficiaries to the identity of
such beneficiaries. Thus, a rule requiring trustees to adhere to the trust
instrument, or a rule requiring ERISA fiduciaries to adhere to plan documents,
is only the obvious answer to the most basic question. The more difficult
question is how trustees or fiduciaries should exercise the discretion extended
them by the governing instrument.
To a very large extent, the exercise of such discretion is guided by the
principles of loyalty, prudence, and diversification of investments. But these are
essentially principles of limitation, demarcating acceptable responses to
53. In re Ward, 121 N.J. Eq. 555 (1936).
54. Wis. STAT. § 881.01(2) (1991).
55. Penn. Co. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27 (1948), cited in FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 228.1.
56. Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184 (1890), cited in FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 220.
57. Astbury v. Beastley, 17 W.L.R. 638 (1869).
58. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(3).
59. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D) 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). ERISA does, however, permit certain
types of plans to invest assets primarily in employer stock. See Id. § 407(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b).
60. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 11, at 4571. The legislative history also indicates that plans can satisfy
diversification requirements by use of pooled asset funds. Id. at 305, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF ERISA, supra at 4568.
61. FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 186.
62. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
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discretionary decisions; they do not wholly eliminate the need to make choices.
Two trust duties, neither of which is expressly manifest in ERISA's statutory
standards, provide guiding principles for making discretionary choices. Because
of ERISA's express incorporation of trust law principles, these duties were
almost certainly intended by Congress to guide discretionary decisionmaking.
The first principle is one of reasonableness. 63 Professor Scott has described
this principle as meaning that so long as a trustee
acts not only in good faith and from proper motives, but also within the bounds
of a reasonable judgment, the court will not interfere; but the court will interfere
when he [or she] acts outside the bounds of a reasonable judgment. In other
words, although there is a field, often a wide field, within which the trustee may
determine whether to act or not and when and how to act, yet beyond that field
the court will control him. How wide that field is depends upon the terms of the
trust, the nature of the power, and all circumstances.'
The second principle, which is related to the duty to exercise discretion
reasonably, is the duty of impartiality.65 In multibeneficiary trusts, trustees will
sometimes have to make decisions whose impact is not uniform among
beneficiaries. The possibility of such conflicts in a pension trust is manifold. For
example, a trust with insufficient resources might have to decide which of two
benefit promises to fulfill; a trustee may have to decide whether to make a risky
investment in an employer security, which may help preserve jobs of active
employees but threaten the security of matured benefit promises to older
employees and retirees.
In making such decisions, the trustee may receive some direction from the
governing instrument, but more probably will be forced to make a decision
without any express guidance from the settlor. A duty of impartiality toward
competing beneficiaries requires trustees to make such decisions in accordance
with the underlying purpose of the trust, not for the purpose of favoring one
group of beneficiaries over another.'
B. Availability of Equitable Remedies
A dissatisfied trust beneficiary generally is limited to remedies available in
equity,67 which include the injunction, specific performance, redress for a breach
(including compensation of the trust for any loss, plus payment of profits made
by the trustee with the trust's assets), the undoing of a transaction, removal of
the trustee, and receivership.' Beneficiaries' access to legal remedies against
trustees is limited.6 9 However, one legal remedy has relevance to trust
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187.
64. FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 187.
65. Id. § 183; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 183, 227(c)(1).
66. Professors Fischel and Langbein have suggested that courts fasten on the rule of impartiality
for purposes of judging ERISA fiduciary decisions. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 7, at 1159-60.
67. FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 199.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 198. Chancery courts did have power to award monetary damages pursuant to their
overall equitable jurisdiction. This has relevance in the analysis of whether ERISA permits participants
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administration: A trust beneficiary may bring a damage action against a trustee
who fails to pay amounts unconditionally owed to the beneficiary.70
ERISA has four enforcement provisions under section 502 that are relevant
to the concerns of this article. Section 502(a)(1)71 provides that a participant
may bring an action to recover benefits under the plan, to enforce rights under
the plan, or to clarify future rights to benefits under the terms of the plan. This
section is the only ERISA enforcement section that includes provisions
paralleling legal remedies.' Section 502(a)(2)"3 provides that a participant,
fiduciary, or the Department of Labor may bring an action for relief under
section 409. Section 409, in turn, provides that a fiduciary who breaches its
statutory responsibilities shall be personally liable to make good plan losses, to
restore to the plan profits made through use of its assets, and to provide other
equitable and remedial relief. Section 502(a)(3) 4 provides that a participant or
fiduciary may bring an action to obtain equitable relief to redress violations of
ERISA or the terms of the plan, or to enforce provisions of ERISA or the plan.
Section 502(a)(5)75 provides that the Secretary of Labor may bring an action to
obtain equitable relief to redress violations of ERISA or to enforce provisions
of ERISA.
III
THE LIMITS OF EQUITY IN RESOLVING POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
Congress intended, and courts have accepted, ERISA as a statute whose basic
precepts were extracted from equity.7' After a decade and a half of experience
with the statute, however, those precepts have failed to resolve, or have resolved
only awkwardly, fundamental and recurring questions of benefits policy. This
section considers three such issues, which are each interesting, pervasive, and not
to bring civil actions for monetary damages against persons who knowingly participate in the breach of
trust. ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides that a participant may bring an action to obtain "appropriate
equitable relief" to redress violations of the statute. (Section 502(a)(2) permits monetary damages
against fiduciaries who breach their trust but does not mention third parties who assist fiduciaries in
committing a breach of trust.) Thus, whether the statute permits actions against non-fiduciaries who
participate in fiduciary violations depends on the meaning of "appropriate equitable relief." Does it
encompass all sorts of relief that could be granted by a court of equity, or does it refer only to non-
monetary equitable types of remedies, such as those referred to in the text? The issue is before the
Supreme Court at the time of this article's publication. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 948 F.2d 607 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert granted, 113 S.Ct. 49 (1992).
70. FRATCHER, supra note 29, § 198. This issue is of more than academic interest; in the balance
should hang the right to a jury trial. See generally, Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions
Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1983).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a)(1).
72. The authorization of actions to recover benefits under the plan is similar to actions against trusts
to recover amounts unconditionally owed to beneficiaries. See supra text accompanying note 70.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a)(2).
74. Id. § 1142(a)(3).
75. Id. § 1142(a)(5).
76. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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adequately resolved through application of traditional equitable rules. The issues
are: (1) the extent to which ERISA should permit a retirement plan to sacrifice
maximum investment return in favor of achieving other benefits for participants,
often referred to as "social investing"; (2) the availability of extracontractual
damages to plan participants whose applications for benefits are denied in bad
faith; and (3) the appropriate standard of judicial review of claims denials.'
ERISA's equity-based standards have obscured consideration of the real
policy tradeoffs raised by each of these issues. Moreover, the courts, bereft of
legislative guidance, have been unable to resolve the tradeoffs in a consistent or
principled way.
A. The Permissibility of Social Investing
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) provides that a fiduciary shall discharge his or
her duties "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries."78  Section 404(a)(1)(B) requires that fiduciaries make
prudent investment decisions. This section of the article considers the effects of
these provisions on social investing by defined benefit pension plans.79
77. There are other ERISA issues whose resolution might depend on the rules of equity, for
example, whether a participant may obtain a jury trial under ERISA, compare Katsaros v. Cody, 744
F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (ERISA claims equitable in nature, jury trial not
available), with International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America v. Midland Steel Products Co., 771 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (jury trial
available for claims under ERISA § 510, establishing cause of action for interference with attainment
of ERISA rights); see generally Note, supra note 70, at 737. (The overwhelming weight of authority
today is in opposition to jury trials).
Additional issues include how plan fiduciaries respond to tender offers for equity securities held by
the plan, see Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); for how
plan fiduciaries should vote such securities, see Letter from David Walker to Avon Products Co. (Feb.
23, 1988), reprinted in 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 391 (1988); for whether participants enjoy estoppel remedies
against plans or plan sponsors, compare Cartwright v. Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 771 F. Supp. 127
(D.C. Md. 1991) (finding estoppel remedy) with Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (3d
Cir.) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2856 (1991) (finding no estoppel remedy); and whether a civil action may
be brought by a participant against individuals for knowing participation in a fiduciary's breach of trust.
See Mertins v. Hewitt Associates, 948 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 49 (1992). See also
supra note 69.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
79. See generally Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment and
the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CAL. L. REV. 518 (1980) (arguing in part that social investment is permissible
under ERISA); James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of
Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340 (1980) (noting ERISA's
constraints on social investing); John H. Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University
Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and Illegal, reprinted from NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, DISINVESTMENT (1985) (arguing that ERISA and trust law prohibit social investing);
John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 U. MICH. L. REV.
72 (1980) (arguing against the wisdom and legality of social investing by trusts and institutions); Fischel
& Langbein, supra note 7, at 1143-49.
This article discusses the issue in the context of defined benefit pension plans. Defined benefit
plans promise a specific benefit to participants. Individual employees do not have individual accounts,
and the amount of their benefit depends on a plan benefit formula. Thus, reduced investment return
does not directly affect the amount of benefits, although strong investment performance certainly
increases the probability that the plan sponsor will decide to improve benefits.
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Two distinct types of plan investment behavior fall under the rubric of social
investing.8 The first type of social investing seeks to conform a portfolio to
certain moral precepts, such as "apartheid is evil," "guns are evil," "tobacco is
evil," or "abortion is evil." For example, an investment fund might seek to avoid
investing in securities of businesses that produce abortifacients or that do
business in South Africa. This type of social investing is problematic under
ERISA because it limits the universe of possible investments, reduces opportuni-
ties for plan diversification, and, by requiring that potential investments be
investigated to ensure moral rectitude, reduces return by imposing additional
transaction costs on the plan."1 It also is morally problematic because partici-
pants in most plans are unlikely to agree on what uses of plan money are morally
appropriate. This article concerns itself more with the second type of social
investing.
The second type of ERISA plan "social investing" occurs when a plan
sacrifices maximum investment performance in return for other benefits for the
plan's participantsY This type of investing is most common among union-
negotiated, defined benefit plans. A plan in the construction trade, for example,
might invest in local projects that employ its members;' or in below-market
rate mortgages for its members;' or in a hospital in a rural community where
many of its members reside.'5 Should the trustee be precluded from such
investments if they will generate lower rates of return than other available
investments with comparable levels of risk, or if they will subject the trust to risk
because they detract from the plan's investment diversification?
In contrast to defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans provide a separate account for
each participant, with the employer's contributions and the plan's investment income allocated among
such accounts. The participant's benefit under the plan is equal to the value of his or her account. The
argument for social investing from a defined contribution plan is strongest if each plan participant
controls the investment decisions for his or her account. See Langbein & Posner, supra, at 105-06.
80. See generally, Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, reprinted in PROXY VOTING OF
PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES (Dan M. McGill, ed., 1988).
81. See Langbein & Posner, supra, note ?, at 72. Such social investing does not necessarily mean
that the investments actually made, considered individually, will pay sub-market rates of return; the
decision of a plan to avoid certain investments may still leave a plan with numerous market-rate
investments, depending on how many investment assets are put off limits. Some social investing can, of
course, result in reduced rates of return. For example, if a plan, rather than putting certain investment
assets off limits, decides affirmatively to invest in local food cooperatives, the plan's rate of return on
such investments might not return market rates of interest. For a persuasive description of why such
social investing violates traditional trust law, see Langbein, supra note 79. But see Joel C. Dobris,
Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of "South African" Securities, 65 NEB. L. REV. 209 (1986)
(thoughtful argument in favor of social investing).
82. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 7, at 1142.
83. See, e.g., Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
84. Id.
85. Prior to ERISA, the United Mine Workers of American Health and Retirement Fund made
such investments. After ERISA, the funds were split into a retirement fund and a health and welfare
funds. The latter fund continued to subsidize clinics in Appalachia for a brief period following
enactment of ERISA. Helen Dewar, Some UMW-Backed Clinics May Close, WASH. POST, July 27, 1977,
at A-3.
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The Department of Labor maintains that the rule of prudence and the
exclusive purpose rule do not permit a plan to sacrifice investment yield to
achieve other social objectives, but that the rules do permit a plan to choose
among otherwise economically equivalent investments based on incidental
factors.' Thus, the Department has opined that a pension plan's creation of
an earmarked fund that could be invested only in construction projects
employing union labor was permissible if the investment criteria used to judge
the investments were the same as those used to evaluate other real estate invest-
mentsY The Department has also granted prohibited transaction exemptions
for negotiated plans that desired to extend business loans to contributing
employers.' But these examples assume that the investments were economical-
ly equivalent (in terms of return) to other available opportunities. The
Department's position, then, is that a plan may consider incidental benefits to its
members but may not sacrifice investment return to realize such benefits. The
Department has litigated two cases that appear to raise the issue of whether a
fiduciary may sacrifice return to achieve other benefits for participants. Neither
case, however, explicitly discusses the issue. In the earlier case, Donovan v.
Mazzola, 9 a union pension fund made a $1.5 million dollar below-market
interest rate loan to a related union convalescent fund, whose membership was
similar, albeit not identical, to the membership of the pension fund. The
Department of Labor challenged the loan as imprudent. The union trustees did
not attempt to defend the pension plan's extension of favorable credit on the
theory that it assisted pension participants who also were beneficiaries of the
convalescent fund.' Instead, they argued that the loans were financially
prudent, notwithstanding that they were granted at interest rates and other terms
favorable to the convalescent fund. The district court found the trustees
liable.91
The second case, Donovan v. Walton,' involved two controversial invest-
ments by the Operating Engineers Local 675 pension fund: a business develop-
86. Section 401(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code mandates that the assets of a tax-qualified
deferred compensation plan be used for "the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries." The
Chief Counsel at the IRS issued a 1992 general counsel memorandum concluding that an employee stock
ownership plan ("ESOP") would not satisfy § 401(a)(2) if it permitted the trustees to consider job-related
criteria in deciding whether to tender stock in a tender offer. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,870 (Apr. 7, 1992).
87. Department of Labor Advisory Opinion Letter to Theodore Groom (Jan. 16, 1981).
88. Northwestern Ohio Building and Construction Trades, Prohibited Transaction Exemption 85-58,
50 Fed. Reg. 11,272 (1985).
89. 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. An argument of this sort was made in Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979), where
trustees of one plan defended a loan to another plan, of which they were also trustees, on the ground
that the two plans had overlapping participant groups. The court noted that the participants in the two
plans were not identical and found that the loan was a prohibited transaction, since the same trustees
were on both sides of the negotiating table.
91. The trustees of the pension fund retained, for $250,000, an associate to prepare a feasibility
study of how to best use property belonging to the convalescent fund. The facts in Mazzola thus
suggested malfeasance bordering on outright theft.
92. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985), affd sub nom Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1986)(ruling on mortgage issue only).
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ment, anchored by an office building to be leased by a union and to be
constructed with union labor, and below-market interest rate home mortgages
to plan participants. Because of the arrangement with the union, it seemed likely
that the office development investment would pay a lower rate of return to the
plan than the plan might otherwise have achieved on other investments.
The fund trustees defended the investments as prudent, without arguing that
the investments provided nonretirement benefits to participants. With respect
to the business development, the trustees argued that they entered into the
venture with the reasonable, well-investigated, expectation of obtaining a high
rate of return. They defended the below-market interest rates by arguing that
the loans, though below commercial rates, paid a higher rate of return than other
plan assets and were apparently consistent in terms with nontraditional mortgage
loans in the area. The court rejected the Department of Labor's argument that
the interest differential between the mortgages written by the plan and
comparable commercial mortgages automatically meant that the loans were
imprudent.93
Dennis Walton, a fund trustee and union officer, gave a series of speeches
around the country following the case's resolution in his favor. In them, he
contended that the investments were made to stimulate local union construction
projects, thereby providing jobs to members and to help members purchase
homes.9' The real issue, then, was that which the court ignored: whether a
pension fund may trade maximum return in exchange for investments that will
increase job opportunities for participants or will provide them with low-cost
home mortgages. In essence, the question is whether a fund may have a major
goal (provision of retirement income) and a secondary goal (creation of job
opportunities or other nonretirement benefits). In the Walton case, the court's
holding suggests some sympathy toward sub rosa arguments that dual-purpose
funds are not wrong per se; this sympathy may explain the court's holding, which,
as a construction of the prudent investor rule, seems indefensible.95
93. Department of Labor regulations promulgated since Walton was decided would treat the
extension of loans bearing a below-market interest rate as prohibited transactions. 29 C.F.R. §
2550.408b-1 (1991). The regulations squarely contradict the holding in Walton. See 794 F.2d at 588.
94. An NBC documentary, the Biggest Lump of Money in the World, included a segment of one
of Mr. Walton's speeches. The documentary was originally broadcast in 1986 and is available from the
NBC News archives. See also Hilary Rosenberg, The Pitfalls of Being a Pension Pioneer, INSTrUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Mar. 1992, at 16 (chronicling history of dispute between Walton and Department of Labor);
Joel Chernoff, Ego Leads to Dennis Walton's Downfall, PENSION AND INVESTMENT AGE, July 8, 1991,
at 1 ("[Tlhrough speeches that effused charm, wit and bluster, he personally ignited the enthusiasm of
dozens of Taft-Hartley plan trustees across the country to put their pension assets to work for their
members.").
95. The Department of Labor's policy with respect to the permissibility of social investing reflects
some ambivalence toward social investing. The Department's policy permits only "costless" social
investing. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Yet the only kind of social investing that is
"costless" is the kind that already produces market-level returns and thus has no trouble attracting
investment dollars in any event. Cf. Alicia Munnell, The Pitfalls of Social Investing: The Case of Public
Pensions and Housing, 1983 NEw. ENG. ECON. REV. 20 (1983).
Yet funds that engage in social investing almost certainly believe that they are accomplishing
something. It is possible that the Department's position that a plan satisfies the prudent person standard
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One important line of argument views a sacrifice of return to accomplish
nonretirement objectives as unsupportable under ERISA. Professor John
Langbein writes that such a sacrifice of return is
unprincipled in the sense that it violates the primary policies of pension law. By
reducing the financial return to the pension fund, bargain rate lending necessarily
sacrifices future retirement income. For present workers it involves just that
trade-off of retirement for pre-retirement income that pension plans were
created to guard against. But the objection runs deeper: the benefits and the
costs affect different people and in different proportions. In particular,
pensioners who are already retired and who depend upon the pension fund for
current retirement income would derive no benefit from subsidizing employment
for current workers.. . . [T]rust investment law (and now ERISA) make it flatly
illegal to sacrifice the interests of plan beneficiaries in this way.'
Professor Langbein's first argument is that retirement plans were intended
to protect a tradeoff between current and retirement income. Nothing in federal
law, however, dictates what that trade-off should be. Sponsors of defined benefit
pension plans may set generous or miserly benefit levels. Once benefit levels are
set, rates of return directly affect contribution rates rather than benefit levels.'
Professor Langbein's second argument is that sacrificing return to protect jobs
or help homebuyers benefits some participants at the expense of others, which
trust investment law makes illegal." He notes that retirees have a single
interest: maximizing plan assets. Maximizing plan assets can financially enable
the plan to satisfy retiree accrued benefits and can enhance the probability that
the plan sponsor will amend the plan to increase a retiree's benefits, perhaps
improving the benefit to compensate for inflation's effects on the value of
benefits. Using plan assets to provide jobs for active employees thus can harm
a plan's retired participants."
by adopting adequate procedures to evaluate social investments' equivalency to other investments has
permitted some plans to sacrifice modest amounts of return to accomplish other objectives. Either the
Department is being hoodwinked or, more likely, it has decided tacitly to approve low levels of social
investment.
The Department's concern in Walton was, it turns out, well founded; the value of the pension
plan's assets, which lacked adequate diversification, have declined precipitously. See Rosenberg, supra
note 94, at 16 (chronicling history of dispute between Walton and Department of Labor). Also, it should
be noted that the fund involved in Walton was not making the challenged investments because such an
approach to investments had been negotiated. Rather, it was a decision made by fund trustees.
96. Langbein, supra note 79, at 11.
97. Federal tax laws reflect hostility to participants using plan assets prior to retirement. Penalty
taxes are imposed on tax-qualified plan distributions prior to age 59.5, I.R.C. § 72(t) (1988), and certain
plans can lose their tax qualification by making in-service distributions to employees, Treas. Reg. § 1.401-
1(b)(1) (1992). These provisions exist to ensure that the tax subsidy such plans enjoy is used to provide
retirement income, the creation of which is the purpose of the subsidy. Use of plan assets to create jobs,
rather than maximize investment return, also directs plan assets away from the goal of producing
retirement income. Thus, such asset use may violate tax policy, an idea to which the text will return.
See infra text accompanying note 104.
It should also be noted again that there are textual arguments under both the Internal Revenue
Code and ERISA that social investing is illegal. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
98. Langbein, supra note 79, at 11.
99. In some situations, it can be argued that creating job opportunities for participants will enhance
the long-term viability of the pension fund when contributions are limited to such factors as hours
worked. Cf. Withers v. Teacher's Retirement System of the City of New York, 447 F. Supp. 1248
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While it seems clear that a pension plan should not sacrifice return when such
sacrifice threatens a plan's ability to satisfy benefit accruals, the question is more
problematic when the tradeoff is between job creation and the possibility of
future benefit increases. A plan sponsor's decision to improve retiree benefits
generally is not a fiduciary decision but a plan-design decision outside the sphere
of ERISA's fiduciary concerns.1°° A retired participant generally is unable to
object, under ERISA, to a union and employer deciding to use surplus plan
assets to raise benefits for current workers only, or to reduce the employer's rate
of future contributions in exchange for higher wages for current workers.1 °1 It
is difficult to distinguish these two situations, on the basis of the rights of
retirees, from a situation in which the union and employer decide to invest
surplus plan assets in projects that will create jobs for current workers." If
Professor Langbein is suggesting that the former two situations are also
objectionable, he is objecting to that part of ERISA that commits plan design
decisions to the plan sponsor. In negotiated plans, plan design can occur at the
bargaining table. The salient policy question in such situations is not a fiduciary
or trust law question; rather, it is a question of whether to place limits on the
contractual freedom of a union and an employer to design a plan. This, of
course, assumes that the use of plan funds to create employment opportunities
for active employees is approved by both the union and the employer, and does
not threaten the security of existing benefits.
Why might a union or a firm want plan assets invested in projects that create
employment opportunities for active workers? Why should a plan sacrifice
investment return (and thus reduce retirement benefits) when unrelated
investment capital might be attracted to local union projects if the union simply
agreed to lower wages for its members? Some unions and unionized firms might
believe that a bias exists in the capital markets against projects employing union
labor, and that the bias is not based solely on higher wages paid to union
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (investment in New York City bonds made it more likely that the city would meet its
funding commitments to the plan).
100. Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3rd Cir. 1991).
101. There may, however, be grounds for raising such arguments if the trustee acting as fiduciary,
rather than the employer acting as plan sponsor, formulates decisions about the plan's benefit structure.
This is not uncommon under certain collectively bargained plans. Under the Taft-Hartley Amendment
to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988), which includes an exclusive
benefit rule, courts have overturned trustee decisions on benefit structure, but recent decisions suggest
that such reversals will be rare in the future. See Phillips v. Alaska Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Pension Fund, 944 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to hold invalid vesting requirements under which
only four percent of plan participants ever vest). In any event, retirees would have no cause of action
if the decision on how to structure benefits were made at the bargaining table. While courts have
recognized a private cause of action for violation of a duty of fair representation, unions are not required
to represent the interests of retirees.
102. Moreover, there are situations in which retirees have little arguable moral or economic claim
to increased benefits. Assume, for example, that during a participant's work life a plan promised
generous benefits but was poorly funded. The participant retires and his benefits are paid with a
combination of accumulated plan assets and current plan contributions. Such a participant has no
compelling claim to increased benefits if, at some later time, the plan achieves secure funding levels
through increased plan contributions.
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employees but also on ideological considerations. Investment of plan assets in
union projects might correct the bias in a way that lowered wage demands could
not. Moreover, firms employing union labor might believe that pension
investments in local development projects increase worker productivity by giving
employees a more direct stake in the enterprise."3
This article does not necessarily disagree with Professor Langbein's
conclusion that retirement plans should be restrained from sacrificing return to
effect other goals. Strong, though arguably not compelling, policy reasons exist
to limit the use of plan assets. From the perspective of the tax system, for
example, use of pension assets to provide nonpension benefits to participants
misdirects the tax subsidy that pension plans enjoy." Multipurpose plans also
raise more complex regulatory problems than single purpose plans, particularly
with respect to ensuring the plan's ability to satisfy already accrued benefits.'0 5
But similar objections might also be made with respect to ESOPs,"° which
labor and tax laws permit.
Although these objections are serious, they have little to do with traditional
trust law. ERISA's legislative history furnishes scant evidence that Congress
seriously considered the permissibility of social investing, particularly the kind
of social investing that provides pecuniary advantage to a significant class of
participants. The Department of Labor and the courts have used the vocabulary
of prudence and exclusive purpose in discussing the permissibility of such social
investing, but this approach begs the real issue: Should retirement plans be
permitted to invest their assets in a way that expands employment opportunities
or to provide other benefits for participants? The trust law principles embodied
in ERISA do not furnish a fully considered answer to that question.
B. Extracontractual Damages Under ERISA
One of the congressional goals in enacting ERISA was to provide partici-
pants with adequate remedies to enforce benefit rights. House and Senate
committee reports noted that
participants lose their benefits not because of some violation of federal law, but
rather because of the manner in which the plan is executed with respect to its
contractual requirements of vesting or funding. Courts strictly interpret the plan
103. Advocates of employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs")-a type of plan that invests in
employer stock and thus gives employees an ownership interest in the employer-argue that such plans
increase worker productivity. See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPS, Law
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1761-70 (1990) (summarizing
claims of possible benefits of worker ownership). Professor Hansmann, however, questions whether
ESOPs, in their present incarnation, increase worker productivity. Id. at 1811-12.
104. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 26.
105. Social investing under such a regime should be confined to well-funded plans. It should be
noted that social investing by under-funded plans presents a risk not only to retirees, but also to the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
106. ESOPs are sometimes used to raise capital for an otherwise failing firm, thereby providing jobs.
Moreover, employers sometimes sponsor such plans as a tax-advantaged means of corporate finance, with
less benefit to the employees than an ordinary retirement plan. See generally Hansmann, supra note 103.
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indenture and are reluctant to apply concepts of equitable relief or to disregard
technical document wording.107
TWo enforcement provisions under ERISA seem to support jurisdiction of a
participant's action for damages resulting from a benefit denial. Section
502(a)(1)(B) vests a participant with the right to bring an action "to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan."'" s Section 501(a)(3), in turn,
provides that a participant may bring a civil action "to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or to enforce any
provisions of this title or the terms of the plan."'" A benefit action, at least
theoretically, can be brought under the latter jurisdictional grant because a
failure to pay contractual benefits runs afoul of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D),
which requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties in accordance with plan
documents.
The jurisdictional provisions are, despite their overlap, fairly rudimentary;
they do not detail the scope of rights and remedies available to participants. The
legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress "intended that a body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."110
In any event, because the enforcement provisions lack detail and specificity,
many questions concerning the scope of procedural rights and substantive
remedies necessarily were left to the federal judiciary.
This section of the article considers a remedies issue that has vexed the
federal courts: whether there are circumstances under which participants may
recover extracontractual damages (including punitive damages) in an ERISA
benefits action."' Judicial analysis of this question has, by and large, focused
on whether extracontractual damages were a traditional equitable remedy."2
The consideration of statutory purpose is relegated to background noise."' As
a result, the courts have fashioned a troublesome body of law that has
immunized plan administrators against meaningful damage awards and failed to
make beneficiaries whole.'14
107. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA
at 2364.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a)(1).
109. Id. § 1142(a)(3).
110. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Senator Javits).
111. See, e.g., Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992); McRae
v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1991); Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan,
887 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
112. Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d at 656-60.
113. Id. at 655 (Although holding against plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit saw "good reasons to allow
beneficiaries to recover extracontractual damages under ERISA.").
114. State law remedies are not available because of ERISA preemption. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144.
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McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Fund"5 is typical of the genre of cases
involving claims for extracontractual damages where the plan wrongfully fails to
pay benefits. Vivion McRae was a participant in a union health benefits plan.
Mr. McRae's wife wished to have a tubal reanastomosis, a minor surgical
procedure to reverse an earlier sterilization. The McRaes' doctor's insurance
clerk called a plan representative to ask whether the cost of the procedure would
be covered. The representative informed the clerk that the procedure was
covered. Mrs. McRae had the procedure.
The plan paid some hospital bills and the anesthesiologist's fees, but later
determined that a plan limitation on elective surgery barred payment for the
surgery. It therefore refused to pay the surgeon's bill and requested that the
hospital and anesthesiologist return the payments already made. (The hospital
complied; the anesthesiologist did not.) The McRaes' credit rating was adversely
affected: they were denied loans and collection agencies pressured them to pay
the bills the plan refused to pay.
The McRaes brought a civil action under section 502(a)(3) seeking payment
of the medical expenses the plan had initially agreed to pay, as well as damages
for consequential injuries they had suffered (such as damage to their credit
rating) and punitive damages. The district court ruled in their favor and ordered
the plan to pay expenses and $50,000 in other damages.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
"equitable relief' available under section 502(a)(3) did not extend to extra-
contractual damages.1 16 The Court relied on dicta in Russell v. Massachusetts
Mutual Insurance Co.,"' a Supreme Court case in which a participant sought
punitive damages under section 409 of ERISA" s against a plan fiduciary who
allegedly inflicted injury on the participant by failing to process a disability claim
in a proper and timely manner. Under section 409, a participant may sue a
fiduciary in breach of ERISA's requirements. The court may order a fiduciary
to "make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary";1 9 the
fiduciary is also "subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court
may deem appropriate. '' "2
The Supreme Court ruled against the participant in Russell, finding that
section 409 was concerned with the relationship between the plan and the plan
fiduciary, and not that between the participant and the fiduciary."' Thus, the
115. 920 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1991).
116. Id. at 821.
117. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140. The Court focused on the fact that § 409 provided that the fiduciary
compensate the plan for its losses and restore to the plan profits that the fiduciary made using plan
assets. Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted § 409 as creating a type of derivative action in which plan
participants could sue a breaching fiduciary on behalf of the plan.
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section did not provide a jurisdictional basis for an action seeking damages of
any sort in favor of a participant; rather, a participant could bring a lawsuit
derivatively to seek damages on behalf of the plan itself. The Court reserved
judgment on whether a participant could recover punitive damages under section
502(a)(3), which authorizes participants to obtain "appropriate equitable relief'
to redress statutory violations or to enforce plan terms."
The Court, in dicta, went further, however, observing that ERISA's
legislative history indicated congressional intent to limit remedies to those
specifically enumerated in the statute. An award of punitive or other extracontr-
actual damages is a legal remedy." a  Section 502(a)(3), which provides for
various forms of equitable relief, does not authorize a participant to seek a legal
remedy.1 2
4
The Court, in reaching its conclusion, acknowledged "that an early version
of the statute contained a provision for 'legal or equitable' relief" and that this
was
described in both the Senate and House Committee Reports as authorizing "the
full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal
court." But, that language appeared in Committee Reports describing a version
of the bill before the debate on the floor and before the Senate-House
Conference Committee had finalized the operative language. In the bill passed
by the House of Representatives and ultimately adopted by the Conference
Committee the reference to legal relief was deleted.1"
A majority of the Court therefore concluded that the enforcement provisions
of ERISA only authorized actions to recover actual benefits under the terms of
the plan (under section 502(a)(1)(B)) or to obtain equitable relief (under section
502(a)(3)). The Court's opinion thus suggests that the enforcement scheme did
not expressly contemplate the award of punitive damages, and the Court was
unwilling to find an implied right to such an award.12 6  The Eleventh Circuit
relied on this construction of the statute in holding against the McRaes.1'27
The Supreme Court's construction of the statute is certainly plausible.
However, the Court appears to have misread ERISA's legislative history. The
Court correctly noted that the committee report accompanying H.R. 2, the
House bill, stated that H.R. 2 provided "the full range of legal and equitable
122. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
123. Section 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1), authorizes participants to bring civil actions "to
recover benefits due ... under the terms of [the] plan." Section 502(a)(1) thus prescribes a legal
remedy, although one limited to recovery of plan benefits.
124. The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether ERISA implied a cause of action for
extracontractual damages; this issue would have been moot if the statute were interpreted to provide
express legal remedies, though in that case a question might have arisen about whether the legal
remedies were limited to those available in contract.
125. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-46.
126. Justice Brennan, writing a concurrence joined by Justices Mashall, White, and Blackmun,
disavowed the dicta in the principal Russell opinion on the availability of extracontractual damages under
§ 502(a)(3). Russell, 473 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. McCrae, 920 F.2d at 821-22. A few district courts have reached a contrary result, holding that
equity permitted punitive damages to be awarded against a fiduciary. See, e.g., Schoenholtz v. Doniger,
657 F. Supp. 899, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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remedies."'" The complete language of the passage noted by the Court is
worth quoting:
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable
remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional
and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective
enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law for recovery of benefits
due to participants.'"
The Court's apparent error in reading the legislative history was its
suggestion that the "equitable and legal" relief language rejected by the
conferees appeared in H.R. 2 as described by the report. In fact, the language
appeared only in the Senate bill;"3 H.R. 2 as originally proposed contained no
comparable provision and nowhere explicitly referred to the availability of "legal
relief."' 31  Yet the committee report accompanying H.R. 2 nevertheless
indicated that the bill was intended to provide for the full range of legal and
equitable remedies.'32 The House bill included a provision permitting partici-
pants to bring actions seeking to recover benefits under the plan.'33 This
provision did not characterize the relief available thereunder as either legal or
equitable in nature. The drafters of the House bill might have believed that this
provision authorized the full range of legal remedies. The provision survived
conference as section 502(a)(1)(B).
It is plausible that the Senate conferees were willing to delete the reference
to legal relief in the Senate enforcement provisions because they believed that
section 502(a)(1)(B) authorized courts to award various forms of legal relief."3
Such an understanding of the legislative history would be consistent with the
history's suggestion that "substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal
with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans.1
135
Another possible reading of the statute that would square with the House
committee report is that the House believed section 409 authorized legal relief
in favor of plan participants; the section permits participants (as well as
128. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA
at 2364.
129. Id.
130. S.4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 602 (1973).
131. The markup of H.R. 2 altered the bill's enforcement provisions; at no stage, however, did H.R.
2 provide explicitly for legal relief. Compare H.R. 2, REP. No. 93-533, supra note 11, at 31 (§ 106(e) in
H.R. 2 as originally proposed), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, at 2211 with id. at 154
(§ 501(e) following markup), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, at 2334.
132. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIE HISTORY OF ERISA
at 2364.
133. H.R. 2, supra note 131, at 154, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, at 2334.
134. The bill that the Senate sent to conference did not include a provision comparable to §
502(a)(1)(B). The Senate bill provided a participant denied benefits with a choice of accepting
arbitration or bringing a civil action under § 693, which provided jurisdiction for "appropriate relief, legal
or equitable" for violations of ERISA. H.R. 2 in the Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 566-70 (1934), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA at 3813-817. Section 693(b), with the reference to "legal relief"
omitted, became ERISA § 502(a)(3).
135. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (remarks of Senator Javits).
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fiduciaries and the Department of Labor) to bring actions seeking "equitable and
remedial relief., 136 The term "remedial" in this context suggests an expansive
notion of the form relief might take in a given case. Although in Russell the
Court held that section 409 relief runs only in favor of the plan, a respectable
argument could have been made that this reading is too narrow.
Although each of the suggested readings of the statute is consistent with the
language in the House report, neither reading is compelled by the actual
language of the enforcement scheme. In addition, both readings are inconsistent
with the Russell dicta. Russell, although offering a plausible literal construction
of the statute, relies on a defective account of the statute's legislative history to
support that construction. 13
7
The Russell approach permits a plan administrator to deny or delay
meritorious claims with near impunity, in effect telling the participants that if
they want their benefits, they must hire a lawyer and sue. Some participants will
not sue because often it is difficult to find a lawyer to take small ERISA
claims.138 Those participants who do sue may have to wait years until the suit
is resolved and benefits are actually paid. In any event, the benefits that will be
paid are only those that should have been paid in the first place.
While failures to pay benefits are not without possible costs to the plan-the
Labor Department might, for example, bring an enforcement action against the
fiduciary and a court might award attorney's fees against the plan fiduciary-the
reality, in many cases, is that losing a civil action means only that the plan must
pay benefits. In McRae, for example, the Eleventh Circuit denied attorney's
fees, even though the McRaes prevailed in their claim to benefits.139  As a
result, a plan has little statutory incentive to pay benefits unless it is sued."4
Thus, the result in McRae has clear costs in terms of benefit delivery,
especially for the elderly on fixed incomes and for anyone with serious and
pressing medical needs. 4' Arguably, the result in McRae also has systemic
136. 29 U.S.C. 1109.
137. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
138. See ERISA Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990) [hereinafter ERISA Enforcement Hearings 1]
(testimony of Jeffrey Lewis on behalf of National Employment Lawyers Association, discussing in part
difficulty ERISA plaintiffs have in retaining counsel).
139. In McRae, a separate Eleventh Circuit panel heard the attorney's fee issue. The panel held that
the district court had erred in awarding fees because attorney's fees are a form of extracontractual
damages. The panel ignored ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), which vests in the district court
discretionary authority to award attorney's fees. See McRae v. Seafarer's Welfare Plan, 933 F.2d 1021
(11th Cir. 1991).
140. Most plans will, of course, pay benefits, for reasons both moral and reputational.
141. Jeffrey Lewis, an attorney testifying on behalf of the National Employment Lawyers Association
before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, told a story about a participant in a health benefits plan who
needed a bone marrow transplant to treat testicular cancer. Like the McRaes, he had received
preauthorization from the plan insurance company to get the operation. He proceeded through the first
step of the multi-step procedure when the insurer withdrew its authorization. He hired an attorney, and
ultimately the insurer agreed to pay for the procedure. Mr. Lewis testified, however, that in the
meantime "his medical condition deteriorated to the point where it may not be curable anymore and he
suffered untold emotional stress, obviously, over the anxiety of whether he was going to get treatment
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benefits, for it spares plan administrators who act in good faith the prospect of
being sued for extracontractual damages. This decision may help create a
climate that fosters plan formation. On the other hand, the prospect of
extracontractual damages would not be nightmarish for employers if awards were
limited to cases of bad faith claims denials. Moreover, ERISA cases are
generally tried before federal judges, who as a group are not known for awarding
exorbitant judgments.
Ultimately, the question of whether participants should be able to seek
extracontractual damages should be resolved on the basis of these competing
policies. But Congress failed to do so and gave the courts no basis on which to
resolve the policies. The judiciary's approach-asking whether extracontractual
damages are a form of equitable relief-turned a hard policy question into an
easy-to-answer but essentially arbitrary inquiry.142
C. Standard of Review of Plan Decisions to Deny Benefits
Fiduciaries of employee benefit plans must resolve questions of benefit
eligibility.143  Such questions often involve interpreting ambiguous plan
provisions or determining disputed facts. How is a fiduciary to decide whether
to pay the benefit? And how is a court to review a denial of the benefit?
The answers to these questions depend on how we characterize the employee
benefit promise. Prior to ERISA, the benefit promise was often regarded as
contractual in nature.'" A participant who was denied benefits could bring an
action for breach of contract against the employer and the plan. But actions
grounded in contract were fraught with peril for the employee, since pension
plans often gave the power of determining benefit eligibility to the employer (or
the plan administrator, who acted for the employer). Such plans commonly
or not." See ERISA Enforcement Hearings I, supra note 138, at 51 (testimony of Jeffrey Lewis).
142. See Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992). In some
cases, courts have permitted awards of damages in excess of plan benefits. The most significant case
involved a fiduciary who paid benefits in a manner that prevented participants from rolling over their
contribution to an individual retirement account, see I.R.C. § 402(a)(5), causing immediate taxation of
the benefits. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, over a dissent, permitted the participant to recover
damages from the plan fiduciary to compensate for the extra tax. See Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905
F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that these
damages, which were foreseeable, were not the type of extracontractual damages considered in Russell;
rather, the pension plan required the fiduciary to pay benefits in the manner directed by the participant.
Equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) extended to money damages to make the participant whole.
In 1991, Congress considered a bill to create an exception to ERISA's preemption of state law
in cases of bad faith denial of benefit claims, which would have permitted employees to seek legal
damages in many state courts. See H.R. 1602 and H.R. 2782: Bills Relating to ERISA's Preemption of
Certain State Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (severance benefits); Brown
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 71
(1991) (medical benefits); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301 (9th
Cir. 1983) (pension benefits).
144. See Note, supra note 10, at 922. However, as late as the 1960s some courts treated pensions as
unenforceable promises to make a future gift. See, e.g., McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 167 N.Y. 530
(1901); Dolge v. Dolge, 75 N.Y.S. 386 (1902).
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characterized the determination of benefit entitlement as final and binding.14
Some courts regarded such provisions not as ousting them from reviewing
contractual rights, but as limiting them to reviewing whether the employer had
acted in good faith. 6 In such cases, a court could rule for an employee only
if the employee proved that the employer had acted in bad faith.
Some courts applied a more stringent standard of review, holding that the
pension contract was a contract of adhesion, to be interpreted against the
drafter,1 47 at least with respect to language vesting the employer with unreview-
able authority to make benefit determinations. A court taking such a view might
interpret the language of benefit entitlement de novo, giving no deference to the
employer's construction of the plan, or might even interpret the language against
the employer who had drafted it.1"
Which approach is correct as a matter of policy under ERISA? Respectable
arguments can be made on either side of the issue. For limiting the employer's
right to latitude in making benefit decisions, one can argue that ERISA's
purpose is to protect the interests of employees in benefit plans,1 49 and that
judicial treatment of benefit entitlement questions as questions of ordinary
contract interpretation best effects such a policy.5° Any other policy, carried
to its logical conclusion, would allow an employer to adopt a plan in which the
employer reserved the right to make benefit decisions on a discretionary, ad hoc
basis.151 This result is inconsistent with the notion, embedded in ERISA, that
benefits are in fact earned wages, which by their nature would be ascertainable,
rather than gratuities.
The counterargument is that the government should interfere with the actual
details of the pension contract only to the extent necessary to effect clearly
articulated and compelling policy goals. 52 Both employers and employees have
continuing interests in pension plans. 153  The employers' interests include
retention of some control over benefit costs and flexibility to structure benefits
to contribute to firm productivity. Allowing a firm to bargain for some
discretionary authority in making benefit determinations provides it with a cost-
controlling mechanism and a means of effecting such strategies. Any rule
denying such authority will make employers less likely to sponsor a benefit plan
145. See, Siegel v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 201 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
146. Id. For similar reasoning under trust law doctrine, as it developed under the Taft-Hartley Act,
see infra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
147. Thornberry v. MGS Co., 176 N.W.2d 355 (Wis. 1970); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc.,
625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1980).
148. See supra note 147.
149. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
150. See Brief of American Association of Retired Persons in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
151. But see Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that employer could
establish plan in which employer reserved right to make entirely discretionary awards of severance pay).
152. ERISA standards in areas such as vesting, survivor rights, and coverage are examples.
153. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 7, at 1117-19.
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and will reduce the employer's willingness to offer generous benefits.'1
Moreover, the employer's reputational concerns generally should constrain it
from opportunistic behavior.15
5
In ERISA, Congress did not fashion a clear choice among these policy
perspectives, and the legislative debates on ERISA are virtually silent with
respect to how fiduciaries should make benefit determinations or the standard
courts should use to review them. Without clear statutory guidance, the courts
have looked to trust and labor law for answers.1 56  Perhaps not surprisingly,
courts have fumbled with the issue.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch,'157 a majority of federal courts held that a fiduciary's decision should be
upheld unless "unreasonable" or "arbitrary and capricious."' 58 Under trust law,
a trustee acts unreasonably if it uses trust assets to advance its interests or those
of a third party, rather than those of the participants. 59 If trust law is the
analogy, this suggests that ERISA courts should have found unreasonable the
trustee decisions that saved the employer the expense of paying benefits."6
Yet ERISA courts often failed to probe fiduciary decisions for such inherent
conflicts of interest. Rather, they upheld benefit denials unless "arbitrary and
capricious," which translated roughly as upholding denials based on plausible
readings of the plan language, at least as long as the reading was not inconsistent
with prior plan practice. 6' One explanation for these decisions is that courts
154. Id. at 1158.
155. Id. at 1128-38. If statutory restraints on an employer's ability to contract for discretionary
benefits are appropriate, they should be limited to circumstances in which the firm has an opportunity
to behave opportunistically. For example, consider an employer closing a plant who must decide
whether to pay severance benefits to a group of employees severed from further dealings with the
employer. Professors Langbein and Fischel argue that courts can impose such a standard by asking what
the parties would have agreed to ex ante if they had negotiated over the particular decision. They
suggest that the employees would not have bargained to permit the employer to engage in opportunistic
behavior.
156. See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1983)
(drawing from law developed under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988)); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (drawing from trust principles).
157. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
158. See, e.g., Harm, 701 F.2d 1301 (1983) (drawing standard of review from Taft-Hartley cases).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. e (Dishonest conduct is not reasonable.).
160. One can make a strong argument that if a plan administrator acts as a fiduciary when it denies
benefits, its actions should be consistent with ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A). This section requires the fiduciary
to base its decisions solely on whether they are for the purpose of providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries. This standard would seemingly mandate that close questions of benefit eligibility
always be resolved in the employee's favor. Perhaps the one exception that such a reading of §
404(a)(1)(A) would permit is a decision going against an employee because the fiduciary has found that
the employer would recover the cost of the benefit by amending the plan to reduce benefits for other
employees.
161. See Cook v. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 801 F.2d 865, 870 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[Wjhere
both the trustee... and a rejected applicant offer rational, though conflicting interpretations of the plan
provisions, the trustee's interpretation must be allowed to control."); cf Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952
F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (distinguishing the pre-Firestone law which had held that the "key to the
arbitrary and capricious standard is that if there is more than one action considered reasonable, the court
must not overturn a decision found to be reasonable even if an alternative decision could also be
considered reasonable"). But see infra note 172 for cases questioning application of the arbitrary and
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mechanically adopted this standard of review from case law under the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act.162
The Taft-Hartley Act required that union pension and welfare benefit plans
be jointly administered by labor- and management-appointed trustees for the
exclusive benefit of employees and their families."63  Taft-Hartley plans
commonly gave their trustees authority to set benefit levels and conditions for
benefits eligibility."6 Participants in such plans occasionally brought civil suits
challenging trustee actions as arbitrary and capricious, and thus inconsistent with
the Act's rule that the trustees administer the plan for the exclusive purpose of
benefitting employees and their families. 65 Some courts accepted these
arguments, reversing Taft-Hartley trustee decisions if they were found to be
arbitrary and capricious."
Post-ERISA courts that adopted this Taft-Hartley standard generally did so
without considering the different natures of the questions arising under ERISA
and Taft-Hartley.67 The Taft-Hartley Act did not provide jurisdiction for
employees to bring civil actions to recover benefits; rather, the arbitrary and
capricious standard furnished participants the jurisdictional basis to challenge
dishonest and arbitrary trustee behavior. In contrast, ERISA furnishes explicit
jurisdiction for actions to recover benefits.1" Moreover, Taft-Hartley trustees
typically set benefit eligibility standards and levels, decisions that allocate finite
plan resources among various classes of plan beneficiaries.'69 Since there is no
correct answer to the question of how to allocate resources, a court cannot
review such decisions on a "right or wrong" contractual basis. A court can only
ask if the allocation was a reasonable one. 7' In typical ERISA cases, however,
the court reviews the plan administrator's construction of particular plan
language, for which there is a "correct" answer.
capricious standard of review when plan fiduciary had conflicting interest.
162. See Harm, 701 F.2d 1301.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
164. See, e.g., Phillips v. Alaska Hotel & Restaurant Employees Pension Fund, 944 F.2d 509 (9th Cir.
1991) (plan trustees refused to adopt liberalized vesting rules); Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir.
1969) (rule adopted by United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Funds denying benefit
credit for periods in which miners were connected with mine ownership); Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (rule denying pensions to miners unless pre-retirement year of employment served with
a signatory employer); Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.
1975) (rule increasing pensions to carpenters who retired after June 30, 1971 in excess of increases to
carpenters who retired before then).
165. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
166. Id.
167. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987)
(noting that courts adopted the Taft-Hartley arbitrary and capricious standard without "noticing that
employers held the whip hard in ERISA trusts as they did not with the joint employer-union trust funds
authorized by Taft-Hartley").
168. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
170. The fact that Taft-Hartley trusts are jointly managed by labor- and management-appointed
trustees also creates some confidence that the decisionmakers are not operating under a conflict of
interest, although it is certainly possible that these trustees will sometimes have common interests that
are not necessarily consistent with the welfare of the plan participants.
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Some post-ERISA courts justified deferral to plan administrators in part
because the administrator was more familiar than the court with plan operations
and employee and employer expectations.171 One could question the wisdom
of this approach. Generally, the administrator is an employee of the plan
sponsor, which often leads to implicit conflicts of interest.
In the 1980s, a few post-ERISA courts began questioning the suitability of
deferential review of plan administrative decisions in situations where the plan
administrator had a conflict of interest."' The issue ultimately reached the
Supreme Court in Firestone."'
Firestone sponsored an unfunded salary continuation plan, which provided
benefits for employees laid off because of a reduction in work force. The plan,
however, did not define when such layoffs occurred. Firestone sold one of its
divisions to an unrelated employer. The new employer hired most of the
division's employees, though on terms different from Firestone's. The central
issue in the case was whether employees retained by the new employer had lost
their jobs and were therefore eligible for benefits under the Firestone plan.
Since the plan was unfunded, Firestone was directly liable for any benefits owed.
The plan administrator decided that the plan did not require payments to the
retained employees. Some employees disagreed and brought a civil action
against Firestone, arguing that the administrator had erred in interpreting the
plan. In the district court, Firestone contended that the court could only review
the administrator's interpretation of the plan for reasonableness. The district
court agreed and upheld the administrator's decision.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a court should not
accord deference to the decision of a fiduciary who "is thought to have acted in
his own interest and contrary to the interest of the beneficiaries."174 Rather,
the court held, judicial review of such a decision should be de novo. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.175
The Court first held that because ERISA "abounds with the language and
terminology of trust law," the courts need to be "guided by principles of trust
law" in determining "the appropriate standard of review.' 176 The Court then
observed that, under trust law, an appellate court should defer to a fiduciary
exercising discretionary power. However, the Court further observed that a
171. See Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (arbitrary and capricious
"standard exists to ensure that administrative responsibility rests with those whose experience is daily
and continual, not with judges whose exposure is episodic and occasional").
172. See Van Boxel, 836 F.2d 1048 (1987) (suggesting a flexible arbitrary and capricious standard
giving only slight or no deference when plan fiduciary is under a conflict of interest); Jung v. FMC Corp.,
755 F.2d 708, 711-712 (9th Cir. 1985) (suggesting flexible arbitrary and capricious standard); Bruch v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting arbitrary and capricious standard
where fiduciary has conflict of interest), aff'd on different grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
173. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
174. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 145.
175. Cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
176. 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989).
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trustee has discretionary power to interpret ambiguous plan language only if the
trust instrument specifically vests the trustee with such powers. Since the plan
in Firestone did not vest the plan administrator with such power, the Court held
that the administrator's interpretation of the plan was not entitled to judicial
deference. Rather, the plan should be treated as a contract, and the trial court
should construe its terms de novo.
The Supreme Court thus created from trust law a contractual model in which
courts engage in de novo review of fiduciary plan interpretations. But the
Supreme Court noted in dicta that "neither general principles of trust law nor a
concern for impartial decisionmaking... forecloses parties from agreeing upon
a narrower standard of review.""17 Thus, firms could "contract" for the pre-
Firestone arbitrary and capricious standard adopted by many courts. Or perhaps
it is not really the pre-Firestone arbitrary and capricious standard at all, for the
Court cautioned that "if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be
weighed as a 'factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion."' 178
Perhaps, then, it is a true trust standard of reasonableness, but only if the firm
"bargains" for such a standard by drafting the plan to include language creating
discretionary authority in the plan administrator.
Firestone leaves in its wake considerable doctrinal uncertainty. When is a
fiduciary laboring under a conflict of interest? Must participants prove that the
fiduciary will suffer personal financial harm if it rules in favor of the participant?
Or is it sufficient to show that the fiduciary is employed by the plan sponsor?
And when does the plan sponsor itself have a conflict? Is there an automatic
conflict if the plan is unfunded, as in Firestone? Is there a conflict if a plan is
funded but the decision will increase the employer's future funding obligations?
Is there a conflict if a plan is overfunded and the decision will reduce a potential
reversion to the employer? Does the amount of the benefit matter? What about
the amount of the benefit relative to the size of the employer? Does it matter
if the employer can recover costs by reducing benefits prospectively for other
employees?
The questions do not end there. How should a court treat the fact that a
fiduciary is operating under a conflict of interest? Should it use a de novo
standard of review?"' Or should it consider the conflict as just one of many
factors? 1" Are questions of plan interpretation different from questions of
fact?'81 What plan language is sufficient to give a fiduciary discretionary
authority over benefits determinations?"u
177. Id. at 115.
178. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d).
179. Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.
1991); cf. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
180. Bidwell v. Garvey, 943 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1991).
181. See Pierre v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991).
182. Compare Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 936 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding no grant of discretion in general language) with Gust, Jr. v. The Coleman Co., 1991 U.S. App.
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Professor John H. Langbein has written a thoughtful critique of the Supreme
Court's opinion, accusing the Court of inventing a de novo standard of review
for trust decisionmaking about issues that are not explicitly characterized as
discretionary under the trust instrument.1" Professor Langbein observes that
a trustee's discretion actually is constrained in precisely the opposite manner:
the trustee has discretion in exercising powers under the trust except to the
extent the trust indenture denies the trustee discretion. Langbein suggests that
"the puzzle about Bruch is ... that the Court insisted on deriving [de novo
review] from trust law (where it is not the rule) rather than contract law (where
it is).'184
Ultimately, the answer to the puzzle, and the blame for the analytic quagmire
that Firestone reflects, is found less in the words of the Supreme Court than in
the silence of Congress. In enacting ERISA, Congress failed to answer, or even
to frame, the question of what a fiduciary may consider when it interprets a plan.
With Congress silent, on what basis should the Supreme Court have determined
the appropriate standard of review for a benefit denial? At least in the hands
of judges, trust law is sufficiently protean to furnish virtually any answer: the
fiduciary's decision should be upheld unless arbitrary and capricious," unless
the fiduciary operated under a conflict of interest, 186 unless the court disagrees
with the fiduciary's construction of the plan language,"8 or the fiduciary's
decision should be upheld only if it can demonstrate that the decision advanced
the purpose of providing benefits to employees."8 But if trust law has failed
to guide courts to the appropriate standard of review, neither would have
contract law, which can be equally protean. 189 The answer can come only from
resolution of the policy questions that Congress left unanswered.
Thus, trust law has not been especially helpful to courts in formulating the
appropriate standard of review for benefit denials under ERISA plans. As a
result, after eighteen years of experience with ERISA, one of the statute's most
complex and recurring questions is not only incompletely unanswered, but is not
even properly framed.
Lexis 15203 (10th Cir. 1991) (fiduciary allowed discretion as long as its interpretation does not contradict
any stated goals of the plan and complies with the requirements of ERISA).
183. John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 S. Cr. REv. 207 (1991).
184. Id. at 225-26.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (discretionary powers subject to control by court
only to prevent abuse of trustee's discretion).
186. Two overlapping trust principles might lead to this approach: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRusTs § 187 cmt. f, illus. 15, 16 ("court will control the trustee in the exercise of a power where he acts
dishonestly").
187. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); but see Langbein, supra note
183, for criticism of Supreme Court's application of trust doctrine.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) ("trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary").
189. For example, an occasional court notes the rule of contra proferentum, construing plans against
the employer. Compare Eley v. Boeing Co., 945 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying rule) with Wallace
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 882 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1989).
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IV
EQUITY AND CONSTRAINTS ON FIDUCIARY SELF-DEALING
Up to this point, this article has argued that ERISA's reliance on equity has
furnished courts with an incomplete, sometimes inappropriate framework for
resolving issues fundamental to the administration of employee benefit plans.
The article now turns to a different problem: the effectiveness of ERISA's trust-
like fiduciary standards in preventing fiduciaries from using plan assets to
advance their own interests. The exclusive purpose rule, and especially the more
particularized prohibited transaction rules, set exacting standards for fiduciary
behavior.
ERISA's use of trust law principles to restrain fiduciaries from self-dealing
and other conduct detrimental to plan participants has a sound theoretical basis,
since ERISA's concern with the use and investment of plan assets closely
parallels the concerns of traditional trust law. While the principles underlying
traditional trust law may not deal adequately with the types of issues discussed
in Part III of this article, they are most assuredly concerned with preventing
trustees from self-dealing and other misuse of plan assets. ERISA's resort to
trust law principles to restrain fiduciaries from self-interested use of plan assets
seems appropriate. But to an extent it also seems irrelevant. An obvious fixture
of any regulatory scheme for employee benefit plans is rules buffering plan assets
against misappropriation. Congress would have adopted some version of the
exclusive purpose rule even if it had not consciously extracted the principles from
trust law. The notion that ERISA is a statute regulating people who are
entrusted with other people's money makes ERISA an heir to equity; Congress's
explicit borrowing from trust law does not.
The success of ERISA in restraining various forms of self-dealing depends
less on the formulation of its fiduciary standards than on the probability that
those standards will be followed. Although many plan fiduciaries will comply
with the statute as a matter of course, others will stray from ERISA's require-
ments when they perceive the benefits of noncompliance to be greater than the
potential costs of noncompliance.
The formulation of a standard for fiduciary behavior is not unrelated to this
calculus. Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman have noted that the trust law
duty of loyalty-which they describe as "a cluster of presumptive rules of
conduct... restrict[ing] the permissible scope of a fiduciary's behavior whenever
possible conflicts of interest arise"l-increases the probability of trustee
rectitude by presuming, often irrefutably, improper use of plan assets when there
is a potential for conflict. ERISA's prohibited transaction rules fit this model;
they absolutely prohibit commercial and noncommercial dealings between a plan
and a party in interest to the plan, unless the dealing is exempted from the
190. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1053-54 (1991).
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rules.191 A knowledgeable fiduciary who causes a plan to engage in such a
transaction knows that if the propriety of a prohibited transaction is litigated, he
or she may be left without a legal defense.1"
But this alone will not ensure a satisfactory level of compliance with the
statute.1"3 Penalties need to be set sufficiently high to deter fiduciary miscon-
duct after discount for the possibility of nonprosecution.194 The magnitude of
this discount partly reflects the number and skill of parties monitoring fiduciary
behavior, and the ease and timeliness with which they can prosecute the civil
claims and criminal charges they discover 95
A. The Effectiveness of ERISA
In assessing whether the statute has been effective, we are hampered by the
absence of any comprehensive empirical studies of fiduciary behavior under the
statute. Troubling indications exist, however, that serious compliance problems
exist despite the statute's strict rules. While the value of plan assets restored and
prohibited transactions reversed through Department of Labor enforcement
actions has not been high,1" the Congressional Research Service has concluded
that the Department has failed to monitor pension funds adequately, despite the
limited investigative resources of the Department."
One possible problem is the rate of compliance with ERISA's prohibited
transaction rules by small employer plans. There are reasons to suspect that
191. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
192. He or she can, of course, argue that he or she was not a fiduciary, that the party with whom the
plan transacted was not a party in interest, or that an exemption was available.
193. I want to consider briefly the level at which compliance might be satisfactory. There obviously
is no correct answer. A near-zero level of noncompliance is consistent with ERISA's protective policies,
but it would be an expensive undertaking for the Department of Labor, which would have the primary
enforcement responsibility, and for plan sponsors who would have to exist with an omnipresent agency
constantly monitoring them. Moreover, approaching a zero level of noncompliance would probably
require imposing Draconian sanctions on those who breach their responsibilities. The costs of trying to
achieve a near-100% compliance level thus might be significant and greatly reduce the willingness of
employers to sponsor benefit plans.
On the other hand, ERISA itself seemed driven by anecdotal evidence of specific instances of
failure rather than by systemic failure. See Ippolito, supra note 8, at 15-20. The driving legislative
principle behind ERISA seemed to be ridding the barrel of a few rotten apples. Given the magnitude
of pain suffered by an elderly person denied promised retirement benefits, this is not necessarily an
unreasonable legislative judgment. As a legislative judgment, it suggests even relatively low levels of non
compliance might be unacceptable.
194. Cf Cooter & Freedman, supra note 190, at 1052-53.
195. The effectiveness of the statute's fiduciary sections partly depends on the degree to which
participants are made whole following a breach. This requires that fiduciary breaches are identified
while the fiduciary still has the resources to make the participant whole.
196. See ERISA Enforcement Hearings I, supra note 138, at 107 (prepared statement of
Congressional Research Service).
197. Id. at 3 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Labor David George Ball, noting no increase in
size of staff between 1974 and 1990 and announcing the Department will seek 33% increase in size of
investigative staff). The Congressional Research Service indicates that staff has also been hampered by
turnover and frequent shifts in policy. The CRS concluded that "the overall consensus seems to be that
PWBA has failed to adequately monitor pension funds and is, in fact, overwhelmed by its responsibilities
under ERISA." Id. at 107.
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compliance might be lower than optimal among fiduciaries of such plans. First,
the Department of Labor has exempted small plans from ERISA's audit
requirements and concentrates its investigations on the plans of large employ-
ers.19 The level of effective monitoring of small plans is thus limited. Second,
small business owners who serve as plan trustees generally are unsupervised, and
thus are subject to a low or nonexistent degree of internal corporate monitoring.
The temptation to "borrow" from a plan thus may go unchecked. Third, the
owners of small businesses, as a group, are likely to be less knowledgeable about
ERISA's rules than are the specialized managers of the plans of large employers.
Fourth, small employers are particularly susceptible to fraudulent practices
among unscrupulous service providers, especially with respect to plans providing
health insurance.1 9
As noted earlier, little empirical data exists on small employer compliance
with ERISA's prohibited transaction rules. However, there is evidence
consistent with the existence of such problems. A former Inspector General of
the Department of Labor testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor
that a high degree of fraud is occurring among third-party managers of welfare
benefit plans marketed to small employers.2' Although the Department of
Labor targets its investigation primarily on larger plans and service providers,2°'
almost half of the few criminal enforcement actions brought in fiscal years 1988
and 1989 were against trustees of small plans or providers of services to small
plans, and virtually all of the remaining actions were against negotiated Taft-
Hartley plans.2' 2 The notion that fiduciary breaches are going undetected is
also supported by the Department of Labor's decision in fiscal year 1990 to
increase, by thirty-three percent, its investigative and enforcement staff.203 In
addition, the director of a respected consumer-oriented pension advocacy group
testified before the Senate Labor Committee that Labor Department press
releases
highlight case after case of ... trustees who have used pension plans as their
personal piggy banks. The abuses [include] situations where small business
owners have dipped into plans to meet a cash flow crunch, help out a relative,
or take advantage of a too-good-to-be-true investment opportunity.2
198. 29 CFR 2520.103-1 (1991).
199. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration has
testified that providers of health services to small employers are often not adequately regulated by the
states. See Dept of Labor's Enforcement of ERISA: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 46-49 (1990) [hereinafter ERISA
Enforcement Hearings II] (comments of Assistant Secretary of Labor David George Ball). An Inspector
General of the Department of Labor testified that fraud among providers of health care to small plans
has reached intolerable levels. Id. at 4.
200. Id. at 5.
201. Id. at 29 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Labor David George Ball).
202. See id. at 78-84 (descriptions of Department of Labor criminal investigations resulting in criminal
indictments in 1988 and 1989).
203. See supra text accompanying note 197.
204. ERISA Enforcement Hearings II, supra note 199, at 109 (statement of Karen Ferguson, Director
of Pension Rights Center).
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In contrast to fiduciaries of small plans, there are reasons to suspect that
fiduciaries of larger plans have a relatively good collective record of compliance
with the party-in-interest prohibited transaction rules.2 5 Such plans are subject
to annual audit.2 '8 Also, the Department of Labor focuses its investigative
resources on large plans.' Fiduciaries of such plans-who will usually be
employees of the plan sponsor-are likely to be more sophisticated about
ERISA; they generally will be aware of the broad scope of the prohibited
transaction rules and the personal consequences of violating them. They may
also be relatively free from the pressures a principal of a small business might
face to use a plan's assets to keep his business viable. The benefits of misuse of
plan assets may seem more attenuated to plan managers of a large employer
than to owners of small businesses. Large-plan fiduciaries also, generally, have
access to legal advice, both to assess whether a transaction is prohibited and to
obtain or fit within an exemption from the rules if it is.
The scope of the "party-in-interest" prohibited transaction rules is reasonably
well defined. A fiduciary aware of the rules generally can determine if a
transaction is proscribed by the rules, at least after consulting with counsel. The
choice for such a fiduciary becomes whether to violate the statute.
This is not, however, always the case with respect to ERISA's exclusive
purpose and prudence standards, whose requirements are more ambiguous.
When the meaning of rules is subject to interpretation, the frequency of fiduciary
violations may be high because of the tendency of human beings to resolve
uncertain questions to their benefit, unless the probability and harshness of
consequences for violations is increased correspondingly.
Section 404(a)(1)(A) requires fiduciaries to discharge their responsibilities
solely for the purpose of providing benefits for participants.2 8 An unavoidable
problem with the exclusive purpose rule arises when the firm has an interest in
a fiduciary decision that is either, arguably, not antagonistic to any employee
interest or consistent with the interests of a group of employees. All other
factors being equal, may the fiduciary select the course of action that harmonizes
with the firm's interest? Courts have generally held that fiduciaries do not
violate ERISA if they follow "a course of action with respect to the plan which
benefits the corporation as well as the beneficiaries."2' Fiduciaries may take
action that "best promote[s] the interest of participants and beneficiaries," even
205. For a description of the prohibited transaction rules, see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying
text.
206. 29 C.F.R. 2520.103-1(a)(2) (1991).
207. See supra text accompanying note 201.
208. The text focuses on ERISA's exclusive purpose rule. Similar problems arise with respect to the
prohibited transaction rules under ERISA § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b), which proscribe a fiduciary
using plan assets for its own benefit or dealing with the plan on behalf of an adverse party. See supra
notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
209. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1982).
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though such action "incidentally benefits the corporation" that employs the
fiduciaries.21 °
In some cases, an incidental benefit test is not especially troubling. For
example, in the case of a profit-sharing plan that refuses a lump sum benefit to
a former key employee to discourage key employees from leaving and competing
with the employer, and thereby reducing firm profits and plan contributions for
other employees, the benefit to the plan seems real enough, and the benefit to
the employer is coextensive with the benefit to the remaining participants.211
In other fiduciary decisions, however, the incidental benefit test seems
inappropriate. Often, the fiduciary must take an action that will have such a
significant impact on the fiduciary (or the firm that employs the fiduciary) that
the fiduciary's judgment is inherently suspect, and the security of benefits is
implicated. Unless the probability is high that the fiduciary's actions will be
scrutinized closely, and that the penalty for breaching statutory obligations will
be harsh, some fiduciaries will act in their own interest to the detriment of plan
participants. This seems true for fiduciaries of large and small plans.
B. Fiduciary Decisionmaking: A Troubling Example
The congressional testimony of Howard Gittis, a director of the Coleman
Lantern Company, and of Macandrews and Forbes, its parent corporation,
provides a revealing glimpse into the thought processes of a fiduciary faced with
a course of action that provides immediate benefits to the plan sponsor but has
potential future costs to plan participants.212 The testimony concerned Mr.
Gittis's selection of an insurance company to assume the liabilities of a
terminating pension plan, a decision that fiduciaries of more than 2000 plans
faced during the 1980s.213
Regulations of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation require a
terminating pension plan to satisfy benefit liabilities by transferring the liabilities
to an insurance company.214 Once the liabilities are transferred, the plan may
terminate and distribute all remaining assets to the employer.215  Because
insurance companies charge different premiums, the selection of an insurer
210. Id. at 271.
211. See Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding decision of plan fiduciary to deny
lump sum payment to former plan participant; benefit to employer only incidental). But see Frary v.
Shorr Paper Products, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (requiring plan to pay lump sum benefit).
212. Pension Raiding Risks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990) (testimony of Howard Gittis).
213. In 1984, the legal constraints on terminating overfunding pension plans to recover "surplus" plan
assets were liberalized, leading to the termination of more than 2000 plans in which employers recovered
at least $1 million in assets. See generally Stein, supra note 105.
214. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2617.2, 2617.14, 2617.21 (1991).
215. ERISA § 4044(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d). The Department of Labor and PBGC published
advanced notices of rulemaking in 1991, requesting information to the public concerning "whether to
establish qualitative standards for annuity providers." See The Effect on Plan Participants of Insurance
Company Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (July 25, 1991) [hereinafter Hearings on Insurance
Company Failures] (statement of Asst. Sec. of Labor David George Ball).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
charging a low premium increases the amount of the assets reverting to the
employer. Insurance companies are not equal in quality, and different insurance
products reflect different levels of risk. Guided by the exclusive purpose rule
and the standard of prudence, a plan fiduciary presumably should undertake a
process to identify an insurance company of the highest reliability-the issue of
concern to participants-and not base decisions on the maximization of asset
reversions through entertainment of low bids.216 A fiduciary with ties to the
employer will have a conflict of interest in selecting the insurer if insurers with
the greatest claims-paying abilities charge higher premiums than riskier insurers.
Mr. Gittis' testimony2 7 concerned MacAndrews & Forbes's acquisition of
Coleman Lantern, Coleman's subsequent termination of its pension plan, and the
transfer of the plan's liabilities to Executive Life Insurance Co., which, within
eighteen months, was insolvent and in state receivership. The decision to use
Executive Life was certainly wrong.21 How did Coleman arrive at this
decision?
Mr. Gittis testified that Coleman selected Executive Life through a bidding
procedure adopted with the advice of Hewitt Associates, a benefits consulting
firm. Twelve major insurance carriers were invited to submit bids. After bids
were received, Mr. Gittis "carefully reviewed, 219 the ratings given to each
insurer by two insurance ratings services, Standard & Poor's and A.M. Best.
One of the twelve bidders was eliminated because its ratings, while investment
grade, were relatively low.2' Executive Life, which at the time of the selection
had the highest ratings from the two ratings services, was selected from among
the remaining insurers, apparently on the basis of low bid. 1
No one at Coleman conducted an independent financial analysis of Executive
Life,222 though Mr. Gittis should have been aware that Executive Life's
portfolio included large amounts of risky, high-yield debt.2" No testimony at
the hearing suggested that anyone at Coleman sought to learn the process by
which Standard & Poor's or A.M. Best determined a company's ratings.
Furthermore, no testimony suggested that anyone at Coleman considered
retention of a neutral fiduciary to select the annuity provider.
216. Hearings on Insurance Company Failures, supra note 215, at 6 (statement of Asst. Sec. of Labor
David George Ball, indicating that a "fiduciary cannot purchase the cheaper, riskier annuity in order to
maximize the reversion of excess assets to the employer").
217. Pension Raiding Risks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990) (testimony of Howard Gittis).
218. The Coleman Lantern story had a happy ending. Mr. Gittis announced at the Senate hearing
that the pension plan, which had not yet completed the termination, substituted an annuity contract from
a sales insurance company other than Executive Life. Id. at 21.
219. Id. at 20.
220. Id. at 32.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 35.
223. Mr. Gittis denied knowing that Executive Life held over $300 million in high-yield debt issued
by the Revlon Group, Inc., a MacAndrews & Forbes corporation. Id. at 33. But he testified that he
knew that Executive Life at one point had over $100 million in Revlon securities. Id. at 32.
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Prior to the completion of the annuity purchase, some California employees
of Coleman read negative local news accounts of Executive Life's financial
viability. 4 The President of Coleman, Larry Jones, concerned about employee
morale, brought these stories to the attention of Mr. Gittis. 221 Mr. Gittis
responded to Mr. Jones's concerns by once more checking Executive Life's
Standard & Poor's and A.M. Best ratings.' After learning that neither
Standard & Poor's nor A.M. Best had downgraded the ratings of Executive Life,
Mr. Gittis closed on the contract.227
This is a rather troubling account of fiduciary decisionmaking. Mr. Gittis,
vested with responsibility to choose a safe annuity for the plan participants,
limited his assessment of the low-bidding insurance provider to the ratings of two
of the principal insurance ratings services after learning from his employees of
problems with the provider.
Worse, the selection of Executive Life as annuity provider was probably the
single most important fiduciary decision in the life of the plan, which was in the
process of transferring all of its benefits liabilities to a single insurance company.
To many of the participants in the plan, these liabilities reflected a significant
portion of their total wealth. Yet Mr. Gittis, a seasoned businessman experi-
enced in high-stakes corporate acquisitions, with millions of plan dollars available
to investigate Executive Life, failed to conduct a meaningful investigation.228
The lesson we should draw from this story, which was replayed in several
hundred major plan terminations that used Executive Life or other financially
stressed insurance companies, is that some fiduciaries, including some who are
stewarding the affairs of plans of major corporations, will discharge their
obligations to achieve benefits for themselves unless they believe their actions
will be closely scrutinized.
The problem here, though, is not that Congress attempted to use equitable
precepts to answer questions to which they were not suited. The problem is that
fiduciary standards, whether consciously borrowed from equity or not, are not
self-enforcing. Without sufficient resources committed to monitoring fiduciary
behavior and enforcement of ERISA's fiduciary standards, some fiduciaries will
continue to step over the line.
V
CONCLUSION
Congress consciously patterned ERISA after equity's rules for the governance
of trusts. Part III of this article argued that Congress's reliance on equity to
furnish answers to many common and perplexing issues of benefits policy was
224. Id. at 59 (testimony of Larry Jones, President of Coleman Lantern Co.).
225. Id. (testimony of Larry Jones).
226. Id. at 35 (testimony of Howard Gittis).
227. Id. at 21. The third major ratings service, Moody's, had not given Executive Life the imprimatur
of its highest ratings.
228. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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misplaced. Part IV, while acknowledging that Congress appropriately used trust
standards to regulate fiduciary self-dealing, suggested that Congress may have
failed to ensure that these standards would be enforced adequately. This
conclusion considers ways in which Congress might "fix" the statute. It also
considers the related question of whether an adequate legislative cure exists.
An easy problem to address is the inadequate enforcement of ERISA
proscriptions against self-dealing. Congress could take four approaches to
improving enforcement: (1) enhance the quality and availability of relevant
information about fiduciary behavior; (2) augment the Department of Labor's
investigative and prosecutorial resources; (3) provide better incentives for
participants to monitor fiduciary conduct and bring suits against defalcating
fiduciaries; and (4) increase civil and criminal penalties for breaches of fiduciary
duty.
In 1990, the Department of Labor reacted to criticism from consumer
groups,2 9 the Congressional Research Service,' and the Department of
Labor's own Inspector General, 1 by delineating the contours of a legislative
package that included improvements in each of these areas. 2
To improve the quality of information, the Department of Labor proposed
peer certification of accountants, and expanding the scope of audits to include
assets held by banks and other regulated financial institutions. 3 The Depart-
ment also indicated that it was consulting with the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants concerning the expansion of an accountant's current
limited responsibility to report wrongdoing to the Department, but that this was
not included in its legislative initiative.? In addition, the Department
proposed that certain providers of health care services to small employers file a
registration statement and that all funded plans disclose how they exercised their
franchise on stock holdings.'
The Department also asked for a thirty-three percent increase in its
investigative and enforcement staff.' To encourage participants to bring civil
actions against fiduciaries who violate the statute's standards, the Department
sought mandatory attorney and expert witness fees for prevailing plaintiffs. 7
The Department further suggested a bounty arrangement, in which it would have
discretionary authority to award up to ten percent of any civil recovery to the
person who provided the Department with information that led to initiation of
229. ERISA Enforcement Hearings II, supra note 199, at 108 (statement of Karen Ferguson on behalf
of Pension Rights Center).
230. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
231. ERISA Enforcement Hearings II, supra note 199, at 4 (statement of Acting Inspector General,
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Raymond Maria).
232. ERISA Enforcement Hearings I, supra note 138, at 2-8 (testimony of Asst. Sec. of Labor David
George Ball).
233. Id at 5.
234. Id. at 7-8.
235. Id. at 6-7.
236. Id. at 3.
237. Id. at 5.
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the investigation. 8  Finally, the Department supported increases in civil
penalties against fiduciaries who enter prohibited transactions.2 9
Consumer groups generally reacted positively to the Department of Labor's
proposals, contending that they were a positive "first" step.2m The proposals
did not, however, address some concerns about inadequate disclosure, including
the limited disclosure requirements applicable to small plans.241
In 1991, the Department backtracked from its own limited proposals.242
Reacting to concern in the business community about the proposals' costs,243
the Department concluded that the proposals (other than the increase in staff)
were unnecessary.
The tensions that prompted the Department first to propose a modest
legislative package to improve enforcement and then to withdraw it reflect a set
of recurring themes in government regulation of employee benefits. One of
ERISA's stated purposes is the protection of employee interests in benefit
plans,' a goal that justifies the elaborate layers of associated federal regula-
tion. However, the legislative history of ERISA is peppered with reference to
a second government goal: encouraging the growth of employee benefit plans
through the provision of tax incentives for employers to establish such plans.4
These notions of regulation and encouragement are not entirely compatible.
The greater the degree of regulation of plans, the greater the direct and indirect
costs to the plan sponsor.2'4 The greater these costs, the lower the size of
benefits and the rate of plan formation. The business community and organized
labor can thus argue against increasing the enforcement of ERISA's fiduciary
standards within the legitimate framework of benefits policy debate. Their
argument is that too much protection for employees will result in fewer plans
and lower benefits.
238. Id. at 5-6.
239. Id. at 6.
240. Id. at 41 (testimony of Dennis Crites on behalf of AARP); id. at 44 (statement of Vicki Gottlich
on behalf of National Senior Citizen's Law Center); id. at 52 (statement of Jeffrey Lewis on behalf of
National Employment Lawyers Association). Each of the groups testifying criticized the Department's
proposals for not sufficiently helping employees with individual benefit disputes.
241. ERISA Enforcement Hearings II, supra note 199, at 108 (statement of Karen Ferguson on behalf
of Pension Rights Center). The Department's proposals also failed to address the Pension Rights
Center's concern that plans are currently permitted to retain the same accountant as the employer. Id.
242. Frank Greve, Heat is on U.S. Pension Watchdog, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 2, 1991, at C-1.
243. David George Ball, Assistant Labor Secretary, indicated that the pension industry likened the
reform proposals to "dropping a nuclear bomb on the administration of pension benefits." Greve, supra
note 242 at C-2. Ball also said that "we must undertake our regulatory responsibilities in a manner
which does not interfere with the marketplace."
244. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
245. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REc. 30,010 (1973) (comments of Senator Ribicoff: "[T]he Federal
Government is already heavily involved in the private pension system. The tremendous growth of the
private programs has been possible only through the use of Federal tax incentives.").
246. See, e.g., id. at 30,046 (comments of Senator Curtis: "[I]n setting minimum standards for pension
plans, account must be taken of the fact that whether the pension plan is set up in the first place or not
is a voluntary action on the part of the employer. Because of this, the standards must not be set so high
as to discourage the formation of private pension plans.").
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Similar tensions discussed in Part III of this article are not satisfactorily
resolved through traditional equitable norms. Should federal law permit plans
to sacrifice optimal investment return in exchange for other participant benefits?
Should it allow employers to reserve the right to interpret ambiguous plan
provisions? Should it bar awards of extracontractual damages? Should it refuse
to enforce oral modifications of written plans? Should it prohibit jury trials?
Affirmative answers to such questions contribute to plan formation by reducing
costs and/or by increasing the autonomy of labor and management to create
employee benefit programs that meet particular workplace needs, as they
conceive them. On the other hand, affirmative answers also reduce the security
of individual employees in their health and retirement benefit expectations.
The resolution of this policy bipolarity in the context of each of these
questions requires legislative consideration. Congress failed, in ERISA, to
address the questions directly, leaving their resolution to the federal courts with
equity as a primary guide. Equity, however, is an incomplete framework for
resolving the benefits policy issues of the sort raised in this article. Moreover,
courts, confronting issues only in the context of individual cases, lack a broad
policy perspective and are confined to the evidence and arguments placed before
them by advocates. They seem poorly suited to balance the competing policies
discussed in this article.
If there is a prescription for ERISA reform, then, it is for Congress to
reconsider particular benefits issues and furnish specific answers to them. This
is a difficult undertaking because of the fundamentally contradictory policies
undergirding the statute. Reliance on a voluntary, regulated system, then, may
be the wrong approach if the government is serious about providing retirement
and health benefits to working men and women. The alternative is either a
system of mandated employer provision of benefits247 or an expanded govern-
ment role along the lines of a funded social security system. But those are other
stories.
247. See generally Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions
Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419 (1984).
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